Arabi Pacha as first known by the writer—His extraordinary devotion to his faith—Personal characteristics of the man—Causes that first placed him at the head of the National party—The comptrollers and the House of Notables—Quarrel over the unassigned revenues, growing out of the rapacity of English officials—Tewfik a mere tool of England and France—His weakness, vacillation, and folly—Arabi's first great act as a popular leader—England, backed by France, solely responsible for the attempted revolution—Ignoble part played by the Sultan—“True inwardness” of the English policy—Arrival of the English fleet—The massacre at Alexandria and the bombardment—Arabi's strategy as a general—End at Tel-el-Kebir—Arabi's mistakes—The war on Egypt resolved into a determination to keep 1325 Englishmen in fat places.

I KNEW Arabi Pacha for many years, but never suspected him of possessing the qualities of a revolutionist. Since the late outbreak in Egypt, many occurrences have come back to me that can be explained only on the theory that even then he was brooding over the wrongs of his race. Far superior to the majority of Arab officers in intelligence, he was reserved and secluded, a man of thought who took care to improve his opportunities. He was a fanatic in his close attention to the duties of his religion, rigidly following its superstitious customs, never neglecting his numerous prayers and ablutions or his attendance at the mosque. Intimate with the sheiks and ulemas, he was always looked upon as a pillar of the faith.

It is a mistake to suppose that he was the only leading man in this revolutionary fiasco ; some of those who were considered the best and most reliable men—officials and others—in Egypt were equally compromised. It was a general uprising of the whole Arab race against great wrongs.

Arabi Pacha is of large size, compactly built, of dark brown complexion, full face, large black eyes of amiable expression, and gentle manner. During the Abyssinian campaign, he acted as a quartermaster in charge of transportation, but did not succeed very well—not from any fault of his, but through the utter incapacity and cowardice of Ratib Pacha, the commanding general of the expedition. Here it is again necessary to notice the comptrollers and their assistants. In order that they might consummate their scheme for thwarting the just action of the Notables in their vaulting ambition to rule, they took counsel from their suspicions and procured an order sending Arabi Pacha from Cairo. Their extraordinary action brought this officer into public notice in the most unexpected manner possible, and placed him at the head of the National party as a political leader. Arabi's offence was that he had drafted new rules for the Notables in 1879. For this reason he was considered as having present influence with them, and consequently as a dangerous man. This unheard-of procedure was the signal for an outburst of indignation among all classes in Cairo. The excitement drew from their homes the quiet and orderly people of that city, and a new and enthusiastic popular ovation was given Arabi. The people accompanied him out of the metropolis, when he obeyed the order of the Khedive to leave the city. Rid of his opposition, the comptrollers threatened the Notables with the thunder of their wrath in case they dared to touch the budget, or even to mention it in their assembly. They could exile them as they had the acknowledged leader of the people, but they could not gag the simple-minded fellaheen from the villages along the Nile. They had created among that silent, downtrodden people a feeling that Allah would right their wrongs.

As Arabi will hereafter act a prominent part in the events which led to the catastrophe at Tel-el-Kebir, it is well to reaffirm that the army had been sadly neglected. The comptrollers, the real rulers of Egypt, not only heaped contumely on it, but it was their secret intention to dismiss the larger portion of the army so as to lessen the expense of the government and to destroy as far as possible any bulwark by which the people could resist the constant oppression visited upon them. The new government, alarmed, had appointed as minister of war a Circassian by the name of Osman Pacha Rifki, a notorious scoundrel, whose history will be found in a chapter on the war with Abyssinia. Certainly there could be no more fit instrument to perform a treacherous act than Osman. The papers of the day state that he appointed to colonelcies a number of Circassians over the heads of many Arab officers who, by seniority, competency, and service, were entitled to promotion. These wrongs and the need of many necessary reforms induced three colonels to present a respectful petition for redress. Subsequently the regiments to which they were attached were ordered to attend a procession. It had in the mean time been determined that upon their presenting themselves for that purpose the colonels should be arrested and imprisoned. Osman was only too glad to engage in the cowardly and treacherous scheme, but his plan proved futile. The regiments, on learning of the arrest of their commanding officers, went in a body and demanded their release, and the craven Circassian, dreading the vengeance of an outraged people, leaped from a two-story window to escape the merited punishment. The result was that the Khedive ordered the release of the colonels and dismissed the infamous Osman. Throughout these occurrences the Khedive, feeling himself in the iron grasp of the powers, was really in sympathy with his people. Pledging his faith at the outset to follow the instructions of his masters, and having been completely entangled in their policy, he could look to them alone to maintain him in his position. But he was weak, and every movement of the people for any right sent a shiver through him. Constant vacillation was the consequence. Arrests and releases of the arrested followed each other continually.

Having lost all confidence in a ministry thoroughly hostile to their interests ; believing, according to the published accounts of the day, that they were being sold out to the foreigner, and feeling that the Khedive was under duress, the people and the army became excited to such a degree that they called upon Arabi, now a prominent leader, to ask the Khedive in their name to redress their wrongs. Arabi with a large body of soldiers then surrounded the palace of the Khedive and demanded the dismissal of the ministry, the assembly of the Notables, and the restoration of the army to its former status. This was no assembly of military for sinister ends, nor an uprising to gratify personal ambition, but it was, as Arabi said at the time, a plan “ to secure by arms the liberties of the Egyptian people.” His famous speech during these events deserves praise, particularly as his act was for the people and not for his personal aggrandizement. He appealed to England, which had made such efforts for the liberation of all slaves elsewhere, to sympathize with the Egyptians in their attempt to obtain liberty. All the acts of this man have demonstrated that, whether in or out of power, he never did aught to justify the imputation of ambition or self-seeking. He merely acted as the leader of nine tenths of the people, who demanded an administration which was theirs of right. Never in any instance did Arabi or the Notables by legislation attempt to deprive the bondholders of the revenues set apart for the payment of their interest.

The English Consul-General, in conjunction with the English comptroller, was busied in creating “ incidents,” the more rapidly to hurry Egypt into a crisis. “ Complication,” as he wrote later to Granville, “ of an acute nature must supervene before any satisfactory solution of the Egyptian question can be attained ; and it would be wiser to hasten than to endeavor to retard it.” This remarkable despatch is the key to the entire policy which by gradual steps led to the expected catastrophe. All the movements of the powers up to this time were in accord, both France and England agreeing that the cause of trouble was with the Notables—namely, the fear of legislation on the budget. Arabi and the military were entirely unmentioned in the published despatches. To Gambetta it was not so clear as to the consul that the action of the commission was “ international.” He looked at it rather as a “ simple proclamation” to reorganize the finances, to which the powers were invited by the decree of the Khedive. Even the comptrollers, when it became urgently necessary to warn the Notables to “ beware,” simply excused themselves by saying it was a mandate written to strengthen the hands of the Khedive. It is now well understood that the statement that the war was occasioned by a violation of “ international engagements” was not true. The published correspondence does not sustain the theory that the Khedive was bound by this fiction, for at the very time the question arose, he objected. They overcame his squeamishness by telling him it was none of his business ; that, being simply the vassal of the Sultan, he must refuse his sanction to any legislation upon finance, and must notify the Notables of his determination. In answer to a protest from the Sultan, they said he had so little interest in such matters that he could not dictate to the Khedive upon this important question. Their crooked policy was like a two-edged sword—it cut both ways. It will be recollected that while these events were occurring Tewfik, foreseeing the coming storm, begged that Turkey might be asked to send troops to Egypt to control the outburst fast approaching. But as this might “ retard” the end his masters negatived the proposal as soon as made.

After this terrible effort, Tewfik once more subsided into his accustomed Oriental mediation on nothing. The Sultan was not apparently lost to all sense of humanity. Foreboding the misfortunes so soon to fall upon the devoted head of the fellah, he proposed sending a general to advise against precipitating his vassal into war. He too wanted to be heard in favor of peace. But this would have been a stumbling-block in England's path to conquest. The Sultan was bidden not to do it. Superior to the menace of the powers, he sent two envoys in the hope of peace, but these were summarily withdrawn in compliance with powerful remonstrance, and the “ excrescence” finally contented himself with sending Dervish Pasha, who arrived too late to do more than play a small diplomatic game with both Tewfik and Arabi. If there were any doubt of “ the anxiety to hasten it,” England cut the Gordian knot by despatching two iron-clads, ostensibly to scare the Turkish envoys out of Egypt, but really to keep up the excitement. This was done against the protest of Turkey, Egypt, and even of the British consul, who, it seems, had not matured his plans. The agents of the bondholders, feeling that their governments had entered earnestly into their cause, refused to listen to the strongest appeals of the Notables for compromise, though these people had shown by every act that they did not intend injustice to any of their lawful engagements, and particularly that they did not contemplate interference with the rights vested in the bondholders. So their timely but respectful request met with contemptuous defiance, and they were told that they really had no right to legislate upon finance at all, not even upon the unassigned revenues. It was declared that “ the action of the comptrollers extends to the whole public service,” assuming directly that they, the bondholders' creatures, were the rulers of Egypt.

M. De Freycinet, Gambetta's successor, on learning of the unheard-of demand of these Egyptian (foreign) officials, exclaimed, “ It never could have been intended that the comptrollers should take the whole direction of the Government of Egypt ;” and the English minister wrote that he “ would not advocate a total or permanent exclusion of the chambers from handling the budget.” The world had passed its opinion upon the extraordinary policy of these officials, and the English Government had to do something, however little, to disavow the action of its representatives. It also became necessary to soften the anger of the creditors ; so the Foreign Secretary added that he had approached the question with “ caution, on account of the pecuniary interests on behalf of which Her Majesty's Government have been acting.” He asked what effect it would have upon finances if the Notables attempted the handling of the unassigned revenues. The consul stated in reply that “ the official salaries would be under their control, and that the Notables would be able to abolish the land survey and dismiss many Europeans in the administration.” By regular methods they had proceeded to entangle Egypt in their meshes, getting all they cared for through the consuls, the Khedive, and the Sultan ; they had now arrived at a point where they could bring their governments directly in conflict with the representatives, and force them to become openly, as they had been secretly, responsible for the events in Egypt. Instead of meeting the Notables in a conciliatory spirit, the Consul-General, knowing that he was supported by the great powers, deliberately turned his back upon them. His act having been approved, by the powers, they were responsible for all the consequences. There was no overt act by the Arabs ; they had merely stated their case ; but daring even to contemplate a violation of the comptroller's orders was magnified into a great offence against the dignity of the governments which had but just unmasked their hidden policy and boldly proclaimed themselves the champions of the bondholders. It is needless to multiply facts showing the spirit with which the new masters of Egypt pursued the representatives of the people. The patient “ beasts of burden” in assembly met it without complaint. But they firmly believed that eventually the two great governments would listen to their appeals for justice in the name of humanity. Instead of this, they were menaced with force if they did not yield their rights to the two comptrollers. This was simply asking them to declare themselves slaves, and to return to their mud villages to be again entertained with the swing of the old sceptre.

It will be remembered that Ismail tried to check the encroachments of the foreigner, and in doing so aroused the deep hatred of the Arab for the latter. But it was too late to stem aggression. It only ended in driving him from the throne. The Arab had learned through Ismail that he too was a power in the land. Tewfik, who began by mortgaging his authority to the foreigner, soon found himself confronted by the Notables, the army, and the people. The Arab ministry, which dared to think for itself and sustain the Notables, was immediately marked for the vengeance of the masters of Egypt. Tewfik was compelled to act against the counsels of his ministry. The Sultan, who at this time was playing a double part through his emissaries, was required to denounce the assembly of Notables and the ministry which supported them. This double pressure led to the resignation of the latter body. Poor Tewfik, who had lost all influence, found it impossible to form another cabinet directly in favor of the creditors, and experienced another bitter check to his policy. The ministry was scarcely dismissed before he was compelled to take it back into his counsels. The Khedive's weakness made him the tool of his enemies. The hour had come, so devoutly anticipated by the comptrollers and consular agents. Under the plea that Tewfik, who had been faithful to them, was in danger, they insisted that it was absolutely necessary to re-establish him, their too willing ally. To effect this grand object, the British and French iron-clads arrived at Alexandria on the 20th of May, against the protest of the Sultan. The English official had previously written that “ the political advantage of the arrival of the combined fleets would override the danger it might possibly cause to Europeans in Cairo.” They soon presented an ultimatum, in which it was stated that “ if necessary, they would visit the ministry with dismissal and Arabi with exile, to restore to the Khedive the authority which belongs to him,” while perfectly well aware, from facts within their knowledge, that neither attempt would be submitted to. Thus it is seen that Egypt was confronted with war, while her people were doing all they could through their representatives to prevent it. The conflict was urged on solely in the interests of the bondholders and their agents, the comptrollers, or so-called officials of Egypt, whose salaries were made to take the most conspicuous place in the startling programme.

This was the state of affairs when the English and French fleets entered the port of Alexandria. It will be remembered that for more than three years, beginning at the close of the reign of Ismail, the National party had been growing, and at this time it comprised the whole Arab population. All the elements, and particularly the religious element, which control the masses were very much excited. Many honestly believed that the foreigner was absorbing their country ; others thought that their Mahometan faith was in danger. The ulemas and sheiks had been unceasing in filling the ignorant masses with this idea. They believed Tewfik to be in the power of the English and French, and though they felt kindly toward him, still they believed their safety rested with the ministry and with Arabi Pacha, whose advice they implicitly followed.

In getting their fleet ready for action under the pretence of protecting Tewfik, the English should have considered that they were acting against a vast multitude, really a mob, spread over a great extent of country, excited by constant outrage and by the fiery appeals of the sheiks and ulemas to a frenzied fanaticism. These unfortunate people in their despair were driven to crystallization under Arabi Pacha, in whom they had enthusiastic confidence. He had stood up manfully for their rights, because, like them, he was born in a mud hut and had experienced the woes of their race. Never before having seen any man who dared to brave authority, who could resist backsheesh, and, above all, who was not captivated by the blandishments of official preferment, there seemed to them every reason, morally and politically, why Arabi above all others should be heeded. The question will be asked, Why was silent contempt the only answer to his urgent appeals to England to extend the same kindness to the slaves of Egypt that she had shown to the slaves in all other countries? The great naval armament had come too far and had cost too much to go back at the beck of humanity. It was its glorious privilege to try its metal upon a poor, miserable, insignificant, ignorant people, who had had all the spirit lashed out of them by cruel taskmasters for thousands of years. As this magnificent fleet lay in their harbor, with its broadsides covering the city, ready at any moment to begin the work of destruction, the ragged Arab population were looking on with a dazed and bewildered curiosity, never realizing, even at the last instant, that “ glorious old England,” around which so many splendid associations clung, whose name had been heralded wherever liberty or humanity had an abiding place, was about, without cause or justification, to demolish their fortifications, lay in ashes their beautiful city, and throw enormous deadly missiles among their women and children, herded together on the narrow neck of land upon which Alexandria is built, and from which there was no escape. To the gallant sailors exhausted in the work of death, when the roar of cannon had ceased for a moment, how sweet must have been the agonizing cry of despair and the shrieks of dying women and children as they came to them wafted by gentle zephyrs through the dense black smoke which enveloped them ! Did they stop to ask the question, “ Are we justified? Have we given these people sufficient warning? Are we dooming these people and their beautiful city to destruction only to gratify the rapacity of unscrupulous bondholders and their cold-blooded agents?”

The worm trodden on will sometimes turn and sting. The massacre of the 11th of June, 1882, was a terrible event ; but could it have been unexpected to those who knew the extraordinary rabble of all nationalities inhabiting Alexandria? The consul evidently expected it at Cairo, but thought the fleet had conjured away the danger. The Mahometan was excited by the threatening attitude of the fleet, which to his mind meant approaching tyranny. The rabble of all other nationalities was simply elated. When the fleets threatened Alexandria there was a regularly constituted government in Egypt. There was no real cause of war between Egypt and the great powers. There had been no declaration of war against Egypt or against the Sultan, against whom such declaration would lie. The fact that the guns of the deserted fortifications, without regular artillerists, were pointed to the sea and the entrance and but few toward the city, is a striking evidence that the military authorities never contemplated fighting a powerful fleet within the harbor. The fortifications at best were wholly unequal to the powerful armament before them, and the repairs going on and the slow movements of a few guns were a mere bagatelle. The massacre which had taken place was one of those accidents which happen among excited people, and if report speaks truly it was just as likely to have been begun by the foreigners as by the Arabs. It is generally conceded that much the larger number killed were Arabs. The movement of the military, the anxiety of the people, the necessary confusion of a populous city, and the separation of the leader and generals from the ministry and Khedive produced delay and often a conflict of orders, for want of any regular system. The orders for instant obedience to the imperative demands of the English admiral were naturally unheeded for want of time, though in reality it was the intention to submit to force. Facts subsequently developed seem to demonstrate this proposition as true, and to show that one reason for hurrying the bombardment was that it might be arranged.

The officer commanding the English fleet naturally smarted under the extraordinary spectacle witnessed a few days before, when many foreigners were killed. He was almost within hearing of the shrieks of the wounded and dying, without the power to afford relief. The fact that the bombardment took place in such hot haste had the semblance at least of hurry to efface, if possible, the mortification of being bearded by a few ragged Arabs. Finding the English fleet had determined to try the effect of the ponderous shot from their enormous iron-clads, Arabi, in the few days he had, made such preparation as he could, to reply to this attack. Feeble though it was, it is said the Englishmen expressed admiration at some parts of the defence. The struggle, as expected, was short ; the fortifications were destroyed, thousands of Egyptians were killed at their guns, and the city of Alexandria was partially burned. France, up to the act of war, was enlisted in bringing Egypt to the support of the policy that the two powers had advocated, but wisely thinking there was no cause for war, naturally sensitive where her honor was concerned, and believing in peace, though equally interested with England in Egyptian affairs, she ordered her fleet to sail out of port before the sound of English cannon was heard in the unholy task of devoting the doomed city and its people to the dreadful horrors of war. There was no justification for the bombardment. Few nations or people have been found to applaud the deed, and England, being wholly responsible with France for leading Egypt to her great misery, impartial history will condemn her act as an outburst of savage vandalism, scarcely paralleled even in her annals.

Recent events are so fresh in the memories of men that it is hardly necessary to say more upon this subject ; but a few words are due to Arabi Pacha, who was placed suddenly in command of the civil and military administration ; for Tewfik, the nominal head of the government in this crisis, being without influence or power, had disappeared and shut himself up in his palace at Ramleh. Arabi's was one of the most difficult and trying situations in which any man could be placed. He was at the head of a country without money and with few resources. But slightly acquainted with government, he seems yet to have brought some sort of system out of disorder, and to have made a brave and successful struggle in diplomacy and intrigue with such time-honored veterans as Cherif Pacha, of Egypt, and Dervish Pacha, the Sultan's representative. His great blunder was in permitting Lesseps to persuade him, under the pretence of neutrality, not to interfere with the Suez Canal, which was in his power for several weeks. He let the opportunity pass under the inspiration of the wily Frenchman. This folly blinded him to a proper and timely preparation at Tel-el-Kebir, for the defence of his line from Ismailia to Cairo, really the only practicable route for the season. Displaying ability up to this point, he signally failed here ; he did not read history aright, which should have informed him that no great nation, especially England, would ever respect international law under such circumstances. His military movements were equally at fault, and proved him unable to cope with his adversary in the strategy of war. Even at the last moment, in selecting the two positions of Tel-el-Kebir and Salhieh, he did well, but he neglected his defences. Above all, he should have concentrated his forces. Instead of having 25,000 or 30,000 men, many of them irregulars, at Tel-el-Kebir, he could easily have had 50,000 regular troops there, by leaving small garrisons at Damietta, Aboukir, Kafir, Dawar, and Cairo. He knew that the great fleet of England could command the coast and capture or destroy its fortifications. His work was in the interior, and his energies should have been expended in massing his forces at the strongest points there. Instead of these ordinary precautions, he undertook the impossible task of defending all Egypt, and was crushed without making a respectable fight. Another important circumstance which had a bearing in hurrying the collapse was the surprise at Tel-el-Kebir. This shows that he possessed the extraordinary characteristic of his race, of never occupying himself with thought of danger except when it was imminent, and of never repairing a bridge unless it were falling to pieces. This Oriental indolence coupled with intentional neglect is remarkably illustrated in this instance. Before an enemy was near, the empty desert being in front and around, the army of Arabi was clouded with Bedouin scouts and pickets in the distance. Every precaution that a general should take when he was in active operation and expected an attack was observed. But, extraordinary to relate, no sooner were the English within a day's march of him than he withdrew his scouts, pickets, and Bedouins, for fear somebody should be hurt. The result was, the English were in the Egyptian defences before the defenders knew of the advance, and the war was ended at a single blow. Since writing the above, I have been credibly informed by a prominent resident of Alexandria, who was there during the events related, that Sultan Pacha, an agent of the English, had bought off the Bedouins from the front of Arabi, and that subsequently he had been paid $50,000 for his services on this occasion. Arabi's ignorance of this accounts for his surprise. Many simple truths are now indisputable ; among them the fact that England and France ruled Egypt through the Khedive for more than three years, and are responsible for the discontent among the people. The purpose of forcing the people to pay the indebtedness of the government to the bondholders and the salaries of foreign officials engaged in their interest was the occasion of sending their fleets to Alexandria. Though the ostensible reason for making war was to protect Tewfik, the ally of the bondholders, against the military, the real reason was that the Notables claimed the right to legislate upon the unassigned revenues of Egypt in the budget, which might interfere with the pay of the 1325 foreign officers forced upon the country. The act of the comptrollers in ordering Tewfik to drive Arabi Pacha out of Cairo for fear he might influence the Notables in their legislation upon the pay of these officials was an acknowledgement that he was a great political leader, and it influenced the entire people of Egypt to consider him as such. There can be no question that Arabi Pacha was opposed to the massacre of Christians, and did all he could to prevent it ; and it is certain that he was in no manner concerned in the burning of Alexandria. In a word, he was honest and humane, and carried on war as best he could according to the usages of civilized nations, at least so far as can be learned from any evidence that has been published, and he is entitled to credit for saving the Suez Canal from injury under extraordinary provocation, it matters not from what motive.

Part I, Chapter XVII

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