Further evidence of Ratib's incompetence—Approach of King John with his hordes—Ratib orders the force out of the fort into the valley—General Loring's first impression that the movement was to concentrate at Khaya Khor—Discovering the mistake, he takes means to secure the new position—Activity of the American officers—Appearance of the Abyssinian vanguard—Abject flight of the commanding general—Preparations for receiving King John's attack—Ratib refuses to advance a skirmish line—Topography of the valley of Gura—Unprotected situation of the right of the Egyptian line—Vain attempts made to have it strengthened—Situation of the two forces—The Egyptian army demoralized by their commander's cowardice—King John's amazement at the position of the Egyptian army—He turn's Ratib's right flank—Vain endeavor of General Loring to order up reinforcements—Ratib deliberately runs from the field, followed by a large portion of his army—Futile attempts of Prince Hassan and the American officers to rally the fugitives—Raschid Pacha, commanding the right, slain while gallantly fighting—The retreating Egyptians deserted by their officers, miss the fort, and rush on the weapons of their foes—A bloody massacre—Attempt made by Loring Pacha to persuade Ratib to a night attack on the enemy's camp—Ratib's refusal—A shining example of ignorance, stupidity, and cowardice.
VERY little of note occurred on the 5th of March, the king continuing to feel his way cautiously. On the morning of the 6th Ratib invited me to go with him to Khaya Khor ; and thinking something was wrong about the fortifications, we took with us Colonel Dye, the assistant to the chief of staff, and Colonel Derrick, the chief engineer. Shortly after our arrival an invitation was extended to go into a tent and talk over the approach of the enemy. In order that Colonels Dye and Derrick might express their opinions, I called them into the tent, it being my custom, whenever opportunity offered, to give the staff an opportunity of expressing their opinions. Upon entering we found Ratib and Osman Pachas and Osman Bey, one of the Colonels at Khaya Khor and under Osman Pacha. It was proposed that the junior should first give his opinion. Colonel Derrick then said in substance that a sufficient command should be left at Fort Gura, and the rest of the command brought to Khaya Khor. Colonel Dye was of the same opinion, canvassing the different roads and the method of protecting them. Agreeing with them in this, Ratib turned to Osman Pacha and Osman Bey, the other two present, who did not understand a word of what had been said, and conversed a few minutes in Turkish, not long enough to tell them what had been said, to which they smiled in response. Ratib, apparently amused, turned toward us and said we were all agreed. His whole manner was marked by insincerity and cunning. Very little further of any importance was referred to, and the conference ended. If there had been any one else concerned in so serious a matter, something might have been expected. Soon after reaching Fort Gura (this was on the 6th of March) I again argued with Ratib on the subject of our movement to Khaya Khor as one which ought not to be delayed an instant longer than necessary to get ready and march there ; for it was naturally to be expected that orders would be issued at once when proposing it. He stared incredulously, as though he had not thought about it, and finally said that he did not intend to give any orders for a movement. I exhausted every argument, but, in spite of his recent assent, persuasion and entreaty were in vain. I was not surprised, and waited anxiously to see what his fear would dictate, for I had ceased to think that any other feeling controlled him, and could now only do the best possible to save him from jeoparding the army by any sudden freak. Thus affairs stood in our fort when night closed. King John in the mean time was concentrating all his strength in the immediate direction of Khaya Khor, undoubtedly with the intention of entering the valley near there, and with a remote possibility of attacking that position. On the morning of the 7th, Derrick, our only reliable scout, was in front of the enemy at an early hour, sending numerous despatches of his movements over the trails by which he was expected. Osman Pacha, commanding Khaya Khor, finally informed Ratib that the enemy was near him. Without further notice or preparation, Ratib ordered verbally about 2500 men, possibly a fraction over this number, together with a number of Krupp guns, to be left a Fort Gura, and with about 5000 men of all arms and a number of guns moved out of the fort. When marching with his soldiers it was his custom to give all his orders in person, without the intervention of a staff officer, either native or foreign. Riding out with the prince after the troops had been marched out for a few minutes, I was surprised to find the command halted within a few yards of the fort instead of marching directly upon the other fort. Hassan, smiling incredulously, said he thought Ratib expected the enemy from some other direction. While in this position, evidently uncertain what to do, I said to him that delays were dangerous, and it was best to hurry to Khaya Khor as the enemy could not be more than eight or ten miles distant ; but he did not budge an inch. Just then a despatch came that the dust of the enemy was seen on the Arato and Amhoor roads leading into the valley, between the two forts and near Khaya Khor. Upon this Ratib moved diagonally across the valley to the right and a little in advance of the fort, and then halted again. I now felt that he had determined not to join his forces, and that the best thing to be done was to secure him in the position he had taken and save his army. This position was on the decline of a prominent ridge, the main height of which circled around his rear some little distance from right to left. There was a deep broad gully running along his front and curving around his right, between him and the hills some distance back. A thick growth of mimosa covered the entire valley in front. On his left he had an open road without obstruction to Fort Gura, and the possession of the prominent hill partly in front of his left secured his retreat. Sending his cavalry in advance, his staff of all nationalities was constantly employed, many acting immediately with the troops and others carrying orders and bringing information. Those actively engaged were Colonel Dye, Colonel Derrick, Major Mökln, Drs. Wilson and Johnson, Major Turnheysen, Captains Irgins, Porter, and Somani, together with a number of Arab officers. Ratib stood on a prominent elevation where with the aid of his glass he could scan the valley, of which he had as perfect knowledge as any one in the army. Notwithstanding this, I kept the staff continually on the move, so that the information in possession of the commander was as accurate as it was possible to obtain, now that the enemy was upon him. Another despatch came to me, which I read to the general, that the enemy was moving upon the Dember trail. This led more directly upon Khaya Khor and was threatening that fort. The road was some distance to our right, probably two miles and a half to where it debouches into the Gura valley, and the enemy's line of march upon it was plainly defined by its dust. Examining through his glass the great clouds of dust moving, which denoted the rapid approach of the enemy, Ratib seemed, in his nervous excitement, to forget he had an army, and wonderingly asked when he saw this dust, why the enemy was coming that way ? The doubt was very soon solved by the enemy's appearance in great numbers on a ridge diagonally across the valley, about two miles distant from the command. We had been in this position a long time before the enemy appeared in complete view on this height, and it was after one o'clock before all his movements could be accurately observed where the Amhoor and Arato roads debouched into the valley. During these events I became satisfied that the commanding general, from his conversations with me and all his actions, did not intend to move out of his position at this place, and under his command I took immediate steps to secure him in it. Dr. Wilson was sent to examine the extent of a deep gully on our right, which wound round toward our rear. He reported favorably, and I proposed to the general that we should go together and examine the gully and secure his right and rear in that direction, as he had determined to make a stand here. The prince accompanied us on this duty. As the affair was becoming every instant more serious, I deemed it best to keep the general always within sight, so that I could instantly be with him in case of necessity, or if any change should be made. This was one of the reasons I had for inviting him to come with me to the right, where he could keep the enemy in view and I at the same time could be near him for any orders. Instructions had been given for the duty we were then engaged in, and while attending to details Ratib unfortunately crossed the gully and got out of my sight. I was surprised to find that he had given an order for a movement. Instantly hastening to the rise on the opposite side of the gully where he stood, I got there in time to hear him give directions to halt the command when he sounded the bugle of his orderly. I soon learned that he had been advised and had determined to move his entire command to a new position. When the movement began I supposed it was his intention to form a connection with the command at Khaya Khor by a rapid movement, which might possibly have been effected, though I thought it was dangerous to undertake, as the time for it had passed ; the active enemy was then actually swarming within the valley. He knew this from observation, and Drs. Wilson and Johnson and Captain Irgins had brought information confirming it. From our position after getting on the ridge, which was better than anywhere else, it was still plain to us that one party of the enemy had already moved toward Khaya Khor ; his movements going and coming we distinctly followed, and the other party some distance toward our right front. The ridge upon which Ratib moved was the same as that we had occupied ; it turned a little more to the right, and gently descended from left to right in a direct line to a point where it was somewhat abrupt ; then, curving sharply, formed part of the glen in the hills which lay between our right and the fort. I had from the time of leaving the fort insisted upon his throwing out skirmishers, and covering his entire front and right flank, and the advance and rear guards, but could not prevail upon him to do it. Now that the enemy was upon him, the safety of his army required it ; but this necessity for the safety of an army he could not understand. I could see parties entering the valley and passing along our front, while others were at this time moving among the heavy growth on our right and into the glen unperceived, and so over the hills toward our rear.
The army marched its whole length in the movement on the ridge before Ratib ordered the bugle to sound. Then it halted at the abrupt point just mentioned, some little distance before the hill turned toward the glen. Finding that his right was probably one mile distant from Khaya Khor, I made inquiry of Ratib whether he was in communication with that fort, and said to him that in a short time the enemy would fill the valley and get between him and his force there ; that unless he effected a junction with the forces there he would jeopard his army, as I had stated to him in the council of war several nights before. He had no plan of action, but had drifted into this position without a skirmish, scout, or picket in his front, even as Arabi Pacha did later, and there he awaited his enemy. Fearing the consequences of his critical position, and anxious that he should communicate with Osman Pacha at the fort looking down upon us, it was proposed to effect that ; but to every appeal he seemed insensible ; in reality he was stunned by the complications which surrounded him. My proposition was to secure our right, in the mean time to communicate with the fort, and by concert of action his command could then strike the enemy in the flank as he moved across the valley, while the troops in the fort could attack the left flank and rear of the enemy, and still victory might be won. The better to understand the movements proposed, it is necessary to give a further account of the valley.
The distance across the valley where the enemy were in force was about a mile and a half or two miles. Khaya Khor was about half a mile to the north of the enemy and on the same ridge with him ; our right was, as stated, a mile distant from Khaya Khor. The valley was everywhere covered with a thick growth of the mimosa-tree. Some of it would conceal a man on horseback, and was cut up with deep gullies which could conceal a large force in its approach, and which, together with the trees, would enable it to pass around us unobserved. The roads Arato and Amhoor, upon which the enemy were, ran directly across the valley and into a sort of glen about three quarters of a mile wide, the trail ran about a quarter of a mile from our right, and went back about three quarters of a mile, and then over the hills to where an abundance of water and provision was obtainable. This was the grand object King John had in view. The ridge we occupied has been already described. The batteries were in the most elevated positions. That in the centre was much higher than any other, and from this point Ratib, who remained there, had a better view than any other in the line ; and from the height immediately in the rear he could take in the whole field and its surroundings far better than anywhere else. The battery on the right was the most important and Raschid Pacha, who commanded the entire right, had it protected. The battalion upon which he relied was subsequently removed and led around the hill, according to him, without his authority ; so that this battery was isolated, really inviting the enemy to creep upon it under cover of the mimosa without danger. The space between this battery and the right was the length of the battalion. It was advised to strengthen this battery at the outset. Of this Raschid Pacha was particularly warned, so as to prevent the enemy turning it, it being an important point in case an attack was made upon the enemy. With that as a pivot it was an easy matter, in King John's movement across the valley, to strike him in the flank with the entire force ; and the command at the fort seeing our movement should beyond a doubt be precipitated upon his left. Placing his army where he did, there was no alternative but to make the fight as stated, or to be destroyed by a protected, unseen, and powerful enemy. It is needless to say that nothing was done. The day was then far advanced, and King John, who had hesitated for a long time, finally threw a strong line of sharp-shooters along our entire front, opening a brisk fire, to which we replied, sending at the same time cannon shot at his force on the ridge and those that were toward our right. This forced the King to circle around nearer Khaya Khor, evidently trying to make his way into the glen on our right. It was then that two or three shot from cannon were fired from the height, which was all that was heard from that fort during the day. The smoke of these cannon was seen from our elevated position. The enemy were soon silenced in our front by a sustained fire from our entire line in their direction, which delayed their movement. The Abyssinians were now evidently approaching, and from observation finding the battery on the right had been left without protection, I hastened to Raschid Pacha and ordered him at once, in the name of the general, to send a force to its immediate relief. In a violent rage he declared that it had been supported, but that without his knowledge or authority the command intended for its protection had been taken from under his immediate control, and that he had just sent an officer to complain of this interference. In my presence another command was started to its support. Soon afterward, learning from Colonel Derrick that there was still no protection, I again went to the right and saw the force sent there returning and Raschid in angry conversation with the officer who commanded it—my impression was, he was reproaching him for coming back. I considered Raschid the best commander in the army, really the only one in whom confidence could be placed, and was satisfied he was doing the best he could. While here, becoming satisfied that this battalion, about which so much has been said, was in danger, a great effort was made to get a force over the ridge to its support, in which I did my best. We succeeded in getting it part of the way up the mountain, when finding my services were required with the general, it was left to a staff officer and Raschid. In the mean time the enemy was thickening in the valley. It was now still later in the afternoon, and they were bolder in their movements.
The scene around our small force was a curious and interesting spectacle. In full view were the frowning bulwarks of Khaya Khor, and the poltroon Osman, skulking behind them with 2500 of the best soldiers of the expedition, placidly looking down upon us in perfect safety, without extending aid when the enemy was within short range of his bristling cannon, and within that of the Remington rifle ; fearing, as he subsequently confessed in an incautious moment, to fire upon King John, lest it might make the sable monarch angry and draw upon his devoted command a fierce and determined attack. Within a half mile of Osman, and a mile and a half of our position, and in its immediate front, marshalled in barbarian splendor upon an elevated ridge, were the serried hosts of the foe, full 50,000 strong, their banners and shields glittering in the declining sun, waiting the orders of their king, the ablest and most renowned African warrior of modern times, to move en masse across the valley. Around our right and rear, there were also lurking in great numbers their bravest and most venturesome warriors. In addition to their great numerical strength, the Abyssinians were known to be a desperately brave people, who had defied the conquering Saracen, and held their mountain homes when more powerful nations around them had succumbed to the scimetar, and who more lately were flushed with their victory over the brave Arrendrup, the unfortunate Egyptian commander, which had inspired them with an exaltation only equalled by the despondency it had occasioned the Egyptians. How, it is naturally asked, could a general go systematically to work to place so small a force, in spite of the strongest protest, in a simple defensive position and await with folded arms the doom so swiftly to fall upon him ? The question can only be answered as it has been already, by saying that what little judgment Ratib Pacha possessed was entirely crushed by abject fear. The events as they have occurred are conclusive that the king did not contemplate this battle, though it is barely possible he would have attacked Khaya Khor. If Ratib had not come up opportunely and put himself in the best possible position for King John to attack successfully, it is certain that the latter would have marched directly across the valley, between the two forts—Fort Gura, five miles distant, and Khaya Khor, one mile distant—and taking the roads already described, have made his way in hot haste to water and provisions, of which, according to our information, he was sadly in need. He never dreamed of finding Ratib out of his fort. In this he was deceived ; and it must be said it was as much a surprise to those immediately with the Egyptian. I have explained the great exertion that was made to reinforce the right of the command. It is possible, if the battery placed there had been thoroughly supported by a very strong force, it would not, as it undoubtedly did in the end, have invited an attack, and the king might have carried out his original design. No man of sense can for a moment think this isolated battery, even though it might have been supported to some extent by the small battalion of 400 men placed around the mountain, and so far from it as not to afford immediate support, could have beaten back King John and his 50,000 men, with every possible advantage on their side, as already detailed. It has been said that the little battalion fought with great bravery, though it too was forced to leave, as it was too much like playing with forked lightning, particularly as the remainder of the army thought prudence the better part of valor and took to their heels. Having just left Raschid Pacha on the right, engaged as stated above, I was on my way to the commanding general when Colonel Derrick overtook me with the statement that the enemy was turning the right. I had for some time been satisfied that numbers were already in our rear ; and it was now, when they discovered the battery on the right isolated and easy of approach, that they dashed against the exposed flank. Derrick, going with me to the commanding general, made the same statement. He thought himself attacked, which was true—at this time the cavalry on the right had taken flight and were coming to the rear mixed with infantry. Ratib, who is of swarthy complexion, upon hearing it became ashy pale, whereas before this he had concealed all emotion. Without giving us time to say a word he rode rapidly toward the left, possibly, it was thought by us, to do something toward saving his army. But he took no steps to that end. Frightened out of the last vestige of manhood, he had deliberately run away, and he did not stop until he was out of all danger. Looking at him for a moment to see what his intentions were, I turned my horse and gathering a number of the staff rode rapidly to the right. It being but a short distance, we were soon near the battery, and were met by the retreating infantry and cavalry mixed in chaotic confusion. There did not appear to be any immediate cause for the retreat, as there was little or no firing in any direction. There were at this time, according to the most reliable information, but few of our men killed—a fact which a subsequent visit with a number of staff officers to the entire field of battle corroborated. It was then that we saw regiment after regiment turn deliberately in their tracks and walk away, Egyptian officers setting the example. Raschid Pacha and a few brave men alone tried to stop the retreat. Making no haste, they laughed while firing their guns in the air, as though it were fine sport. Soon the fugitives became an unwieldy mass, and resisted all effort to stem their retreat. The American and foreign staff threw themselves in their front, but after extraordinary efforts were forced along with the retiring column. I had seen retreats before, but this one cannot be described. Becoming general, men and officers, artillery, camel, horses, and mules were out of control and in the greatest disorder. Our forces had no sooner left the right than the enemy rushed pell-mell in pursuit of the plunder left. Arms scattered on the field, and camels, horses, and mules running wild attracted the Abyssinians, who valued these objects more than they did the Egyptian soldiers. For some time their attention was turned to gathering the spoil. They then left the scene of action with their booty for fear that others might rob them of it. King John, meanwhile, on the top of his ridge, witnessed this extraordinary movement, and in his amazement could not understand what it meant. Never having seen many disciplined troops, those about him say that as soon as he recovered from his astonishment, his first impressions were that the Egyptians were moving to a position for the purpose of attacking him in the rear as he moved across the valley. Observing our army in the distance moving slowly, it was natural for him to believe this, for he had not up to this time determined upon a decided attack. When it flashed upon him that the Egyptians were retreating in a confused mass, he instantly gathered up his clans. With shouting, drums beating, and the shrill shriek of their wind instruments there was a general rush of the entire Abyssinian horde, and the valley soon became alive with the moving mass. Those who first reached our rear fell like the others to wrestling and fighting among themselves for the riches left on our line of march, and only a few followed us. The Abyssinians, accounting for their extraordinary conduct, told me that often as many as fifty men would rush after a single mule, and the lucky individual would mount him and start over the hills for his home. The necessity for a rear guard to cover the retreat induced a chase after Ratib to bring him, if possible, to the rear for the purpose of forming one.
I found him on foot at the head of the retreating column, engaged in a laudable effort to push back the entire army with the flat of his sabre ; for, being a short man and on foot, he was entirely covered by his men, and out of every possible danger of a stray shot. The engine being more powerful than the bull, the little man was stepping backward at double quick, which, from the activity he displayed, did not seem unpleasant to him. There was just time to tell him that he must come back with me to the rear of his army ; that the mob could not be stopped in that way ; there was no time to waste, and that unless he did it at once his army would be lost. It was necessary to give an order to some officer to form a command of his best men where he then was, and let the others pass in the road to Fort Gura, as there was not a living soul in the rear capable of doing anything. The prince with large numbers of the staff was far in the rear, using every exertion to stem the torrent, but in vain ; and King John was moving at that very moment rapidly up the valley. The enemy's horsemen were then distinctly seen coming across the valley about in his direction. Ratib, catching a glimpse of the terrible vision (being covered by his men he had not seen it before), straightened himself up, looked several inches taller, and scanned the heads of the jumping cavalry as they bobbed up and down among the mimosa trees of the valley. One look was enough ; he doubled himself up as though he were going to say his prayers, Mahometan fashion, in the belief that his last day was come, and then suddenly disappeared, like a prairie dog into his hole, rushing headlong into the crowd of soldiers, who laughed at the dodge of the commanding general. Little did they dream that the farce was soon to be turned into one of the most terrible butcheries ever witnessed. I rode back with the staff to see whether some pacha or bey could not be found to do something for the army, as those who commanded regiments could alone do it, but all these gallant men, except Raschid Pacha and Osman Bey Nahgreeb, one of his colonels, had ignominiously fled and left their men to their fate. These two brave men were on foot. There was not at this time a single officer to be seen who was mounted. Colonel Dye, Dr. Wilson, Captain Irgins, and Colonel Mökln, Captains Porter, Somani, Turnheysen, Dr. Johnson, Colonel Derrick, and Major Dorholtz, and a number of the Arabs of the staff were near here in danger, as they had been, through the day, doing all they could, as true chivalric men should do under the extraordinary ordeal through which they had passed. A few minutes after the events I have related happened, poor Raschid Pacha succumbed to a fatal wound. I had known this gallant soldier for many years, and a more brave and honorable officer was not to be found in any army. It is an agreeable task, where so many were recreant to their duty, to record his death at the post of honor.
So far few had been killed on our side. It was impossible to say how many of the enemy had fallen, but no doubt quite a number. Riding with numerous staff officers every few minutes from the right to the left before this retreat had commenced, I observed no alarm among the troops and was fully informed of the number killed and wounded. It was after the retreat that the butchery took place. It was now, however, certain from the facts detailed and from the developments of the enemy, that it could not be long before a clash would come, and that if King John acted with the same sagacity and determination he had shown in surrounding Arrendrup, this helpless mass might be at any moment called upon to meet a terrible shock. Its commander being completely paralyzed, the consequences must be fearful. This condition of affairs so apparent to my mind was the reason why in person during this entire day I exerted myself in every conceivable manner and with several staff officers kept in motion throughout the line, in order, if possible, to save the army. To the end that a faithful history of events may be related, I mention this now because I am compelled to speak of my own movements constantly. It was painful to feel that in all this well-armed and well-appointed army there was not an Arab officer to assist us in organizing a force to protect the rear—and only an Arab officer could have controlled the men then. Finding it hopeless, we followed along with the moving mass and coming to the gully of the morning, the command choking its roads over it, we crossed it lower down. There we were met by Colonel Dye, who had been wounded, after bravely exerting himself during the day, and he crossed it with us. Stopping on the opposite side, I ordered the bugle sounded once more to try and rally a portion of the command, but finding the fugitive mob resigned to their fate, I reluctantly abandoned further effort. Dr. Johnson was wounded and captured near here shortly afterward, and not far beyond Major Dorholtz dismounted to adjust his bridle, when the cavalry fell upon him and he was also badly wounded and captured. While riding near a prominent isolated hill, about one and a half miles from Fort Gura, the enemy appeared upon it and fired upon our party, but my escort returning the fire drove him back.
Unfortunately, Dr. Wilson, who was near me at this moment, had his leg broken and his horse shot through the body. One of my orderlies by the same fire was shot through the lungs, and another desperately wounded and left for dead on the field. He subsequently came into camp. Several of the Arab staff were wounded and captured during the day. At this crisis large bodies of cavalry were coming up in our immediate rear, and on the right flank of the moving column. Noticing the head of the column bearing away from the fort, then about a mile distant, Captain Irgins was sent to turn it in the right direction. There was at this time some of the enemy's cavalry and a few Abyssinian footmen between us and the fort ; there was every reason to face this danger rather than the greater one, for there was a heavy body of cavalry and footmen coming up rapidly toward the right flank of the troops and in our immediate front. For some unaccountable reason the column did not change its direction, and to this day it is impossible to give a rational explanation of their course in not following the ordinary instincts of self-preservation. Though the fort was almost within a stone's throw, they persisted in turning from it, notwithstanding Irgins pointed the right direction and ordered the column to go there. What was most surprising was that Ratib Pacha, Prince Hassan, and a large body of officers parted from this very command, and were edging toward the fort. The commander, who had taken such pains to make cowards of his men, as he rode away was seen waving his hands to them to follow him, but in his folly he had lost all hold upon even his ignorant soldiery. Soon the cavalry began to thicken as it approached in our rear, and was showing itself on our right, our front, and in the direction of our path to the fort. With my escort exposed to a fire from the hill on our right, the situation now became not only complicated but exceedingly dangerous. Had Ratib gone in person to the head of the column it would have followed him beyond a doubt, but he was destined to add this chaplet of infamy to a character already stained beyond redemption. Here too he rode deliberately away from his command and left a large body of the troops sacredly intrusted to him to a certain doom without making an effort to lead them out of danger. Nothing in the record of war, or that I have ever heard of or can conceive of, equals the utterly degraded cowardice shown in this abandonment of his troops. Ratib and his party were immediately opposite the fort, on a direct line, and while engaged with the enemy on our right we kept his movements under observation. It was not long before we were cut off from the command and between two fires ; a few minutes more and Ratib and his party must be inevitably cut off from the fort, but they rode rapidly for the place of safety. The direction of our small party was at first at right angles to theirs, but soon turning the point of the hill upon which the enemy was posted, our direction became diagonally toward the fort. There was a cannon shot about this time fired from the fort directed up the valley, but it was very soon stopped, as it was ascertained that numbers of our men were making their way down the valley. An artillery fire from Fort Gura might have answered a good purpose at the time of the enemy crossing the valley, but now it was too late. Ratib was safely in the fort, and from the parapet he could see his army step by step marching into the power of the enemy. There it was that the cowardly Circassian, with force enough in the fort, with the aid of the cannon in it, to beat the enemy off, looked on supinely and saw his abandoned soldiers moving with measured tread, in plain view, going slowly along the slope of the mountain, not a mile distant. At least he could have made a diversion, for he had a large force, as already stated, and the enemy's cavalry was but a small one compared with the Egyptian infantry, alongside of which this cavalry was riding, sticking their lances into the men and capturing them in droves. Dr. Wilson, who is still a surgeon in the United States army, had been carried into the fort, having been terribly wounded in the affair at the hill. This very gallant man throughout the day had borne himself with the utmost daring and coolness, and no danger had appalled him. My orderly was dying from his wound. On arriving at the fort, and getting another, with a fresh escort, I and a few others retraced our steps for the purpose of guiding the retreating command. Getting as near as it was possible to approach it, and in a position where we could be distinctly seen, almost within hailing distance, while exchanging shots with the Abyssinians, who were between our party and the Egyptian column, we tried by every means to attract the attention of the Egyptians and to get them to turn upon the small body of cavalry on their right flank which was immediately in our front. It is impossible to convey the sensation of horror which thrilled us in witnessing this terrible sight. The Egyptians not only let themselves be killed by a handful of savages, but slowly continued to turn away from the fort and were marching into the enemy's clutches, which beyond a doubt must result in their general massacre.
Having been joined here by Osman Bey Nageeb, the last Egyptian to leave the troops, I sent him to the commanding general to report the facts above stated and to say to him that, having several thousands of fresh troops in the fort, he could by marching them out safely open the way for the rescue of his people, and that he would find no difficulty in driving back the small body of cavalry on their right flank. Besides this message, I sent word by a responsible officer that I should remain outside until relief came or until the last of his people were to be seen. This message was repeated to the bey so as to make him comprehend the whole situation. I have no doubt that he repeated it accurately, and so the last effort that could have been made by Ratib he let pass. It is well to observe that Ratib Pacha could see everything from the parapet of the fortification. Any man of courage would without prompting have done as advised. Other messages of the same import were sent, but no answer ever came, while the little force I had was gradually thinning out. The Egyptians slowly and as it were in measured tread making no resistance, were seen throwing away their arms, while others were being lanced and killed, or surrendering in bodies in plain view of the commanding general and those in the fort.
Further comment is unnecessary upon the conduct of the Egyptian commander, and if it were words must fail to express the just indignation that one experiences for so infamous a creature. Here I stood, physically and mentally fatigued, and witnessed this sickening spectacle, after one of the most anxious and laborious days in my long life, and as the column of Egyptians was winding its slow length along, we knew that it was creeping into the entangling web of a remorseless and cruel foe. Still no effort was made from the fort, no message was sent, no aid, no troops ; the silence of death reigned there ; it was the shadow of the doom that awaited the remnant of the army which had so gayly marched out of Fort Gura in the morning.
The enemy in our front increasing, they gradually forced us back just as the last of the Egyptians entered the hills and disappeared from sight. It was then that the Abyssinians closed in upon their rear with a ringing shout of triumph. That night Ratib sent a secret order to Osman Pacha to abandon Fort Khaya Khor and come to Fort Gura, the safety of the prince being his plea. That gallant young man laughed, because he knew that Ratib was concerned only for his own safety. Luckily Osman, never contemplating any risk to his own skin, did not obey the order, and thus the command of 1500 men under General Field got there about one o'clock in the morning in safety. Hearing of the order, Field thought it ought to be obeyed after his arrival, and urged compliance upon Osman, but this fellow, like his commander a miserable coward, slipped off from Field and let him wait in the saddle all night expecting the order.
The enemy, but a short distance across the hills which intervened between us, made the night hideous with prolonged yells and howls like the roar of wild beasts. It came from gathered thousands of savages rejoicing over the scenes of a bloody tragedy. These struck additional terror into the heart of the unfortunate Ratib. Hearing the unearthly screams and no Osman coming to save him, he was only thinking of himself and the dawn of to-morrow, when the enemy would again pounce upon him. Crouching in a corner, with huge piles of hard bread in bags thrown around him and over him for additional protection, he constantly cried in his agony of grief that the Khedive would certainly order him to be shot. Finally, the howling ceased, and the Abyssinians, drunk with blood and satiated with massacre, sunk to sleep by the side of their fires, the flickering of which on the hills could be plainly seen.
Ratib becoming more tranquil, he too about this time doubled up, Arab fashion, and went to sleep in his corner of the fort. Hearing that Field had arrived and had joined forces with Osman, I went in search of Ratib Pacha, and stumbled upon the prince in the dark, whom I found in great sorrow. I told him I was in search of Ratib, with the proposition that as Osman was coming to us with his command and that of Field who had arrived there, he should be halted outside and united with most of those in the fort, and in the darkness we could march noiselessly to the top of the hill, one mile distant, and under its crest, a half mile from the sleeping camp, be ready there, at the dawn of day, to open fire and make an easy prey of the enemy. If they heard us at night, knowing we had received reinforcements, their uncertainty would induce them to scatter. In any event we could not but meet with success. If trouble ensued we could fall back under cover of our fort. In this way we could retrieve the losses we had met and rescue the large numbers of our soldiers scattered among the hills and in the valley who would otherwise fall into their power on the returning day. The prince thought it was useless to try Ratib, as he did not think I could get him out of the fort.
In the dark, among old rubbish and bags of bread, I found Ratib after a long search. The magnificent son of the Prophet was fast asleep, and with no little difficulty was awakened from his deep slumber. Soon explaining my mission, I related all that had been said to the prince. Rousing himself and reflecting a moment, his reply was that he did not believe it possible to undertake it, and again subsided into dignified repose. It so happened that the cautious Osman, possibly suspecting that something of the kind might be done, did not come as expected. Thus ended the last effort of the day to save the great numbers of our wounded still on the field and the soldiers scattered in large numbers in the valley, in the gullies, and among the mimosa-trees, to say nothing of the honor of the command. I ascertained long after midnight that thousands of camels were outside the fort and immediately alongside of it which could be saved without an effort, but that if left there without securing them, they would certainly stray off or be taken by the Abyssinians in the morning. This would deprive us of a great portion of our transportation, which might at any moment become important. After going to everybody who was awake, I finally found Yusef Bey in the darkness, the officer in command of the fort. I gave him this important information, and impressed upon him the fact that the preservation of this transportation might involve the safety of the command, and explained to him how it could be effected with perfect ease, as eight or ten men could do it. He too, though an instructed man, was so frightened that he answered my proposition with bated breath, as though the Abyssinians might hear him, that he did not think it safe to go out under the breastworks. There was not the slightest danger. As expected, these thousands of camels, mules, and horses were all gone in the morning, except a few within two hundred yards of the fortification, and they were driven off in plain view of the command by the brave enemy.