CHAPTER V.
PREPARING FOR THE CAMPAIGN.

Arrival of Prince Hassan for service on the staff—Luxury of his outfit—Discords and intrigues at headquarters—Ahmed Bey, Governor of Massowah—Pressing need of an early march and the route selected—Delay from the difficulty in getting a camel-train—Secret opposition of Ratib Pacha to the prosecution of the campaign—Serious difficulties which the chief of staff had to meet—Arrival of released prisoners and a messenger from King John—The horrible condition of the mutilated prisoners and the effect on the Egyptians—Detention of the Englishman Kirkham, the envoy of King John, as a prisoner—Kirkham's sensible advice.

Hassan Pacha, Son of Ismail.AT Massowah we were joined by Prince Hassan, the third son of the Khedive, an active, stoutly built young man of twenty-two. He presented a letter from the Khedive asking my kind attention, and another to Ratib Pacha requesting a place on his staff for him. Partly educated by an Englishman, Hassan was sent by the Khedive to Oxford by advice of the Prince of Wales, whence graduating through a royal road to learning he returned to Egypt in 1873 and was an actor in the noted marriage festivities in that year, with two half brothers and a half sister, the beautiful Fatima. He married Khadigeh Hannoum, a beautiful and accomplished young lady, the granddaughter of Mehemet Ali, and a few months later went to Berlin and entered the Prussian army, the Emperor and royal family receiving him well.

If the matter had stopped with Hassan's simply being a staff officer it would have been well, but Ratib insisted on showing him royal honors during our stay at Massowah. The greatest possible care and solicitude were shown for him, and it looked as though the real object of the expedition was changed, and that the prince hereafter was to be the strategic point.

One of the eccentricities of his advent was his sumptuous table, which groaned with every luxury. He was kind and hospitable, and I was invited to mess with him during the campaign. Though the offer was tempting, I thought best to enjoy the frugal repast of my own table, as I had supplied myself with a fine cook and many good things, and was really independent, even of the government, enough to prefer messing alone ; besides, he scarcely or never invited any other of the Americans to dine with him. So I enjoyed dining with him by special request only, a courtesy which in his good nature was frequently extended.

Another motive on my part was to discourage this unnecessary luxury, I thinking it best to leave all this display in the rear, on account of the scarcity of transportation. Ratib Pacha, a bon vivant, had no idea of losing the sweet things of the prince's table. The choice viands and costly wines hung lingeringly upon his cultivated palate, and having no idea of making war if he could help it, he could see no reason why there should not be a “ flow of soul” in this princely excursion in the Happy Valley of Abyssinia. All these interesting incidents occurred amid no little clashing between the general staff of Ratib Pacha and a kind of private staff, through which, to our astonishment, he was in the habit of issuing secret orders, which conflicted with his “ regular orders” sent to the army.

While engaged in harmonizing these discordant elements, we were startled by an indignant complaint from the commanding general that some correspondent in the army had been criticising him in very severe terms, and that the criticism had reached the Khedive. It was well known that those at court were the peculiar friends of Ratib Pacha, and consequently everything sent came back to him. As such a thing was calculated to cause distrust in one naturally suspicious, I told him all I had written. He thought that somebody else must have had “ a finger in the pie,” and expressed a great fear that imprudent communications might get into the papers. I had great difficulty in soothing his troubled spirit. An order of the Khedive directed that all correspondence should be opened, and this caused heart-burning among many of the officers from the commencement of the campaign, and continued to its close. This fresh incident did not ameliorate the unpleasant order.

I have already written a full statement of the affair of Arrendrup, circumstantial and reliable enough to place beyond doubt that Major Dennison and Ruchdy Effendi, by their good judgment and courage, saved the survivors of that unfortunate disaster. The young governor, Ahmed Bey, nephew of Sadik Pacha, the unfortunate Finance Minister of the Khedive, had been sent, on the death of Arrikel Bey, to Massowah. Without thought, and before he was conversant with the facts, he sent a telegram to Cairo saying that these officers were in fault. On my arrival I found that they were under censure. An explanation from myself to Ratib Pacha here, which I got from Major Dennison, and a letter which I sent to Cairo, put the matter at rest without any difficulty. Ahmed Bey now made another effort to distinguish himself. Having heard of Ratib Pacha's sending a proclamation to the people of Abyssinia disclaiming any idea of conquest, he thought he too could send one that breathed fire and sword against King John and his people and made the most extraordinary demands. Coming to me with his agreeable smile for my signature, the intrigue was met by my crushing the aspirations of the ambitious young gentleman. He gently subsided. Becoming afterward the pliant instrument of Ratib, I do not think he ever made another attempt to distinguish himself.

It was found that there were few camels at Massowah, our reliance for transportation. Weeks passed, and yet they did not come. In the mean time the necessity for seizing strong places in the mountains, before the enemy could gather an army and the approach of the rainy season, and the urgent orders from Cairo to hurry our march into the interior, gave us serious concern. Therefore there was a necessity for reducing baggage and material to articles absolutely needed. Estimates were accordingly made, and places on the route selected. The admirable and reliable paper already referred to concerning Abyssinia, written by the Abbé Duflot, having satisfied both General Stone and myself that the direct route to Khaya Khor and the Gura valley, about eighty miles from the coast, was by the way of Yangoos, Bahr Rezza, and Addi Rasso, this route was determined upon. Immediately on reaching Massowah and conversing with Major Raif, one of Arrendrup's party, who had been to Khaya Khor, I was confirmed in my opinion.

Ratib Pacha, who had also fixed upon this road, had the habit of spreading out a large map and inviting the Pachas to go over it with him, and he very often pointed out the wrong road. Upon being corrected in this, he would say that he did it because he did not want every one to know the road he intended to take. There is one thing I will mention, because it aided me. In the East everybody carries a seal, and the humblest Arab wears it on his little finger ; it is the sign-manual and evidence of his bond. From the fellah to the Khedive, the seal is the signature, and like a signature, the seal is authentic. It was a common thing for me to give my seal to the Americans and most of the Europeans among us, to facilitate business. I did this in my own good office, as it gave me more time for reconciling differences, overcoming obstacles, smoothing ruffled passions, keeping the commanding officer in good humor, and by a candid course with him thwarting the petty intrigues of the marplots who surrounded him. The subject of transportation, to enable us to move, was all important, and those who had anything to do with it were blamed. Ahmed Bey, the governor, came in for his share of abuse for delaying it, but I have ceased to believe him responsible. Ratib, all powerful, dictated, and the governor obeyed. Largely, too, the delay was not only the fault of the system of government, but the extent of country to hunt it up in. Spread over sparsely inhabited regions like the Soudan, the Bedouins must be hunted before their camels could be got. These shrewd men of the desert dread to lose their animals, and at the first alarm of war they drive them far into the most remote and inaccessible places, beyond reach of the pursuing officer. This of course involves delay, but it would be childish raving in the Western man to abuse the ruler who is acting from the habits of ages, because he and his people do not change in a few days or years and act in accordance with the most approved system of a higher civilization.

Enough camels to start the vanguard of the command finally arriving, the necessary orders were issued through the chief of staff by the commanding general, and Osman Pacha, with a command of over 3000 men of all arms, began the advance, and General Field, inspector-general, the ablest and most experienced officer who had reported for staff duty, with Colonel Mökln, another able man, were assigned to duty with him. Their command had hardly left before the private Arab staff of Ratib Pacha, which I had supposed to be defunct, turned up as a factor. Ratib, forgetting his own orders, commenced in his inexperience a series of instructions to Osman Pacha, conflicting with those already given. This caused some confusion and delay, and Ratib, apparently very repentant, promised to do better in the future. This performance developed the serious and important fact that little dependence could be placed on his determination or promises. Often in minor matters I humored him in order to get him to attend to those of a vital character. Very often, however, in vital matters he went in direct opposition to my advice and his own orders previously given. The opinion was forced upon me that he and Osman, both being opposed to the campaign, took secret measures to delay it, thinking to deceive me in the field and the Khedive at home by their apparent willingness. After a barefaced wrong like that just mentioned, Ratib would proclaim his innocence and swear by the Prophet it should never occur again. This state of things was rather ominous at the outset of the campaign, but I was determined to force it through with the aid of the Americans, if it could be done with the assistance of these able officers and an experience of over forty years, much of it in just such war as this. I never despaired, to the last moment, of inducing the commander to overcome his fears and prejudices and be guided by a little common-sense. Having a fine army well armed, I knew that it was capable of winning success if properly handled. In reading this book the reader may be amazed that such a military comedy as the one I speak of could be played in any country in this enlightened age. He may think it strange that I should have remained throughout under such an ordeal ; but he may have already surmised the motives and influences which induced me to stand by the interests of the Khedive to the bitter end, amid surroundings that would have caused many to refuse to assume the slightest responsibility. As the delay caused by Ratib affected the transportation, I will state that before leaving Massowah, in order that Ratib and his lieutenants might know the precise situation, there were prepared estimates and maps of roads, stations, and trails, which were mentioned in an elaborate report. I invited Ratib and his two commanders, Raschid and Osman Pachas, to attend and have everything explained to them. In talking to them they seemed to comprehend the estimates, but paid little attention to the topography of the country. Ratib with only a modicum of intelligible French, the Pachas knowing only Arabic, and the interpreter knowing but little of either of those languages, it was of course difficult to make them comprehend, under any circumstances, what the explanations were. Ratib, after an ignorant effort to say something, finally gave it up and sat through the conference with the imperturbable indifference of his race pictured upon his quizzical face, while the other Pachas looked as if time for prayer had arrived and their pious souls hungered for the performance of that important duty. Having determined at the outset on the Khaya Khor route, I frequently advised the bringing up of the troops which were at Sanheit and on the frontier of Bogos and Gallibat to operate on our right flank, and particularly to take into the service friendly chiefs and their warriors, there being several of them who were hostile to King John. Other important men could have been induced to aid us, but for some unexplained reason, I never could tell what, this was not done. Shortly after our arrival, Kirkham, an Englishman who had been for several years in the service of King John in Abyssinia, came to Massowah. He was sent under the pretence of bringing back to us as a peace-offering an officer and one hundred and five prisoners captured in the Arrendrup affair. His object was to slip through our lines. Of these unfortunate people, twenty-seven were horribly mutilated. Such miserable creatures were never before seen in war. The King had two objects in sending these victims back. One was the hope that Ratib Pacha, induced by apparent kindness, would let Kirkham pass through with his letter to Queen Victoria complaining of Egypt. This person, fearing the Egyptians, remained outside of our lines, and sent word with the prisoners that he was sorry he could not come with them. The cunning hint of the king fell flat upon the ear of the Egyptian commander, who determined to let no one pass from under his authority. Another idea of the king was that this savage reminder should impress the ignorant Egyptian soldiers with a dread of what they might expect from the cruelty and prowess of the Abyssinian. This well-timed embassy had the desired effect. Instead of lashing the Egyptians into a frenzy of righteous indignation and the desire to revenge their mutilated comrades, it filled them with dismay to see such evidences of the ferocity, the bravery, and the strength of the enemy. These unfortunate wretches, in telling their tale of sorrow and misery, too painfully marked upon their persons, did not fail to exaggerate the courage and power of the Abyssinians, the difficulties of advancing into the country, and the almost certain death that would follow the attempt. The Egyptian officers talked with bated breath, and heard the conversation of these people with the soldiers in a quiver of suppressed fear. Altogether it was a sad and horrible scene, and most damaging in its effects upon the morale of the expedition. Some savages cut off the heads of their enemies ; and some, like the North American Indian, take their scalps. It was the custom of the ancient Egyptians, even in the reign of so grand a Pharaoh as Usurtasen, in the splendid era of civilization in the twelfth dynasty, to mutilate the dead, leaving the body on the field, carrying the trophies of their courage to the king to be counted and engraved on the Temples of Thebes and Memphis, where the traveller can see them to this day. But the Abyssinians mutilate the living in the same manner.

So the officers of the Egyptian army commenced bitterly deprecating the war, declaring it unnecessary, and lamenting that they were all to be killed. They said that Egypt had more land at home than they could cultivate, and that it would have been more to the interest of their country to keep the army there to till the soil and take care of their suffering families. Officers and men in discussing the invasion saw an enemy behind every bush and rock. The passage through mountain gorges, to these men who had lived all their lives in the level lands of Egypt and were unaccustomed to lofty heights, magnified the difficulties of the advance, their fears preparing them to believe that great rocks would be hurled down upon them, every step disputed, and no man allowed to escape. It was not long before Kirkham and two English companions who were with him were made prisoners by our outposts and came into camp. The two men with Kirkham, by the name of Houghton, were well-informed Englishmen who had strayed into the country, and as there was no reliable evidence to satisfy Ratib that they had taken any part in the war, he thought best to risk the imprisonment of one Englishman, Kirkham, and let the others go, as he was fearful of international complications. On releasing the Houghtons he asked as a favor, for many reasons, that I would treat them kindly, and this I did without inconvenience. The imprisoned Kirkham was also treated kindly and was often visited by the American officers during his confinement, there being no severe restrictions laid on him. Mrs. Bent, with her young child, the widow of a missionary and the daughter of Dr. Schimpffer, a noted German botanist, long a resident of Abyssinia, whose wife had been one of that people, came into camp at the same time with Kirkham. She was immediately released when these facts were known, and she left shortly afterward en route for Jerusalem.

The appearance of this man Kirkham, dressed in an old and dilapidated English uniform, was that of one utterly used up by disease and dissipation. An adventurer, he had served with Walker in Nicaragua and with Gordon in China. He was wounded in India, had been a steward on a Red Sea steamer, and then a general in the army of King John and governor of one of his provinces. Priding himself upon his nationality, he was indignant that an ambassador from the “ king of kings” to the Queen of England should be put into captivity, and threatened vengeance against the Khedive for his violation of the laws of nations.

Kirkham said to me in one of his conversations that King John in forty or may be fifty days would have a fighting force of over 60,000 men ; that he was reconciling all the chiefs ; that he did not intend to move from near Adua until he had a large army ; and that if we expected success we must hasten and attack him before the Gallas, the Raz of Shoa, and the Raz of Godjam could join him about the time already stated. He said that while he hated the Khedive, it would depend upon circumstances whether he ever returned to Abyssinia. He liked the Americans, and was sorry to see them in the country ; and for their sake he would advise them to hurry up their movements. These statements proved singularly true. Ratib Pacha was informed of them, but expressed contempt for their source. He declared that he intended to keep poor Kirkham in prison until finally he should be compelled to feed upon the insects he bred upon his person. There is no doubt that if it had been in his power to do so he would have executed his threat. After a while I persuaded Ratib to let the prisoner walk about the town and visit my headquarters, thinking him perfectly harmless. On the return of the army to Massowah after the campaign he was still a prisoner, and was possessed with the idea that he was being poisoned. He was taken sick, and Colonel Lockett, a kind-hearted gentleman and one of the most accomplished of our American officers, devoted much of his time to ministering to his necessities. He had him removed from the place of his imprisonment to the Lutheran mission, where charity relieved his last wants, and where he died before we left the country.


Part II, Chapter VI

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