Ratib disposes of his would-be Abyssinian allies—Vain attempts to organize a system of scouting parties—The terrible fright of the commanding general—Movements of King John—The Abyssinian's reputed message to Ratib—False alarms—Demoralization of the Egyptians—Utter lack of capacity and courage in Ratib—The council of war—General Loring explains the situation and lays down a plan of operations—His advice ignored by the council—What Prince Hassan said—Osman Pacha ordered to desert Khaya Khor, but the order countermanded—Utter worthlessness of Osman.

THESE two worthies (Leige Barrou and Degatch Mikaïl) were disposed of by Ratib giving them empty promotions. Leige Barrou, on being dismissed, disappeared entirely ; the other, during our affair of the 7th, succeeded in stealing one of King John's lions. I never heard of anything else he did on that occasion. His offer of men was refused, but he was promised the government of his province of Hamazen and made a pacha. His right to the place depended upon whether or not King John could drive him out. His honors were brief, for not long after we left Abyssinia the pacha was a fugitive within the frontier of Egypt. As Ratib had no authority to give titles, it made little difference, but it answered his purpose to keep this man quiet.

Before leaving Massowah the commanding officer was advised to organize a system of scouts and always keep them in advance—a corps composed of the best officers and men well mounted. But he put the matter off ; his army marched along haphazard, relying upon Allah. We were no sooner encamped in the valley of Gura than scouts became necessary for our safety, and even then it proved difficult to organize them. Ratib stationed one third of his command on picket on the hills ranging one and two miles around him, and strong mounted pickets on all the trails leading to his fort. Then he threw a line of sentinels around his fort within one hundred yards. Besides this he kept one half of the command all night standing at the parapet with their Remington breech-loaders charged and lying upon it, but would not send out scouts, the great necessity of all invading armies. Soon there was an alarm of the approach of the enemy. The men, scared by the excitement of the pacha, cocked their pieces in the dark as they lay upon the parapet, with all the thousands outside on guard and within range of the Remingtons. At the least movement they would no doubt have fired, and there is no telling the damage that would have been done to our own people. Luckily news came from the front that the alarm had been created by a herd of cattle, and the camp for the time being settled down into peace again. After no little persuasion, and urged by the prince, who told Ratib he was making old women of his soldiers, the commander finally allowed scouts to be sent out, and staff officers Derrick, Irgins, Somani, and Dr. Wilson were ordered on this important duty. The king in the mean time gathering his clans at about the time that Kirkham had said he would, learned from his spies and scouts the fact that Ratib Pacha had no idea of moving farther into the interior, which, now that he was strong, would have suited him admirably. It being impossible for the enormous cavalcade he had with him—men, women, and children, (for they all go to war)—to remain many days in any one locality, he was forced to begin his movement. There were no trains or baggage to impede him, and living entirely on the country he was passing over, it soon became known that he was south of us and making the first decided demonstration. Developing clearly his plan of operations, it was not long before his advance extended to the Mareb River, indicating his purpose to march to our rear. Small parties spread themselves over the country and mounted the hill-tops within eight or ten miles of us. In the mean time our scouts, under determined staff officers, very often obtained sight of them, and gave chase, running them from the field. The good effect of this upon the soldiers was at once observable ; they had seen the enemy, and he had fled before them. It correspondingly alarmed the Abyssinians. Upon the king it was salutary ; for drawing in his people his movements were stopped. Unfortunately, while these matters were going on an event occurred which in its result did us incalculable harm. Captain Irgins, a bold, experienced officer, had been ordered out with a large scouting party on the 27th of February, with explicit orders to do a certain duty. While he was engaged in carrying out his instructions to the letter, Prince Hassan happened to go out of camp a short distance a little to the west of our camp, where there was a rocky eminence overlooking a considerable distance ; and standing there he descried smoke, really in a direction contrary to that in which the scouting party had gone. Thereupon he rushed headlong into camp, imagining that a fight was progressing, and imparted the terrible news to Ratib, whose fears were always alive. The latter went a step farther and conjectured that all the command had been butchered by the Abyssinians. Coming into camp and finding it in an uproar and Ratib excited, and instantly knowing that the alarm was groundless, I tried to reason him out of his folly, but he was so demented as to be incapable of listening to reason.

Without ascertaining the road the reconnoitring force had taken, he sallied out with a still larger command to the rescue, wringing his hands before his soldiers in great agony of mind, declaring that these men were certainly all killed, and that the Khedive would have him shot when he got back to Cairo. As soon as the news came I went to the rock upon which the prince had immortalized himself, and saw that the smoke came from a small wood fire in the distance, and was not the smoke of firearms in battle. I returned immediately with such information as would satisfy any one with a modicum of sense or experience, that it was only the smoke of a single fire in the mountains, not more than a mile in the distance, and entirely unlike that of a gun of any kind. But it was lost upon this unfortunate man. Going out some three miles and night coming on, he stopped his command in a cul-de-sac, so that if there had been an enterprising enemy about he would have had a good chance to slaughter the Egyptians to a man. Ratib, valuing his own skin, returned to the fort only to find that Irgins had come back at the time appointed, innocent of what was occurring, not having seen or heard of an enemy that day. The nerves of the commander were so shattered by this event that he never recovered, and what was still worse, it put an end to our scouting. We had labored so persistently only to enable King John to get the information he wanted ; for the abject conduct of Ratib was so notorious that the people all knew it and carried the information to the king. The Abyssinian conducted his movements with more boldness than before, and his parties showed themselves with impunity to the Egyptians, moving around us while travelling through the country of the people disaffected to him, and by burning their villages, as we could see from our camp, visiting punishment upon them. These people, to avoid greater horrors, fled into the valley of Gura in great numbers, and gave minute accounts of the movements of the king and his intentions. Taking this route was not only strategic, but it had the effect of striking terror among the inhabitants of the valley, who were his enemies. As we were without scouts, and acting in accordance with the Arab fashion of calling everybody into the fort for fear that somebody might be hurt, it was through these fugitives alone that we could get direct information of the whereabouts of the enemy. One of their reports was that the king intended to attack Fort Gura. Relying upon this information, Ratib sent a despatch to Cairo, on the 26th of February, that the enemy was expected to attack his camp. The king was at Abba Mata on the Ist of March, and on the same day his advance was heard of as far as Tzaze. The course of the enemy could be traced by burning villages, which corroborated the statements of the flying people. The scenes in and around our camp were sources of merriment to those living in the valley, it being currently reported among them that the king had sent word to the pacha of his being aware that he had only old women under his command who were afraid to come out of their fort and fight a battle ; that they really intended to stick within it ; but that, when he was ready, it was his purpose to come to Fort Gura and there pen him up and eat him at his leisure. The alarm of war, so often sounded, was exemplified at the fort again. I had just entered my tent at a late hour in the night when, hearing a shot fired, soon followed by a fusillade from nearly the entire command, I hastened toward the line to know the cause of the trouble. In the mean time there was a tumult within the camp which added to the general excitement ; the tethered animals in great numbers broke loose and were racing over tent-cords amid the yells and shrieks of the Arabs, which with the firing made the scene a Bedlam not easily described. It was utterly hopeless to learn anything without stopping the noise. A bugler passing me in the dark, I ordered him to sound “ cease firing.” Quiet being thus restored, it was found that a soldier, alarmed, had discharged his piece at an imaginary object. This incident is referred to because of its bearing upon discipline, and for the reason that we had several hundred men scattered along our entire front within range of our rifles. I am not aware of any one being injured by this wild discharge. It was another experience of the army so soon to be tested in a fearful tragedy.

These simple-minded people, capable of making good fighting soldiers, were thus by a series of wretched follies on the part of the commanding general brought to such a nervous state that upon the least excitement their alarm knew no bounds. Ratib Pacha and his commanders were victims of the same state of mind, and the confidence of the troops in them was utterly destroyed. Ready to run at the approach of the enemy, the men, appreciating their fine qualities in this particular, stood on the qui vive to follow their chiefs at the crack of a gun. This is the culminating fact among those already detailed in explanation of the fatal results of the fighting, an account of which it is proposed to give in this statement.

The king from the outset in “ swinging around the circle” had but a short distance to travel from Adua to Khaya Khor, the latter place being in our rear. From accurate information there was no doubt that he was moving in that direction, and was, when last noticed, in proximity to Khaya Khor. This directly threatened that fort and our communications between that mountain pass and our depot at Bahr Rezza. There was not the slightest difficulty in his interrupting our communications if he pleased to do so. All the movements and facts which came to us went to show that King John did not intend attacking us at this time in our intrenched camp, but Ratib affected to believe that he did, even after every one ceased to share the idea with him that the Abyssinians would come within cannon range. On the 3d of March our small scouting party gave accurate information, and news also came to us from the fugitives already mentioned, leaving no doubt of the intention of the enemy to enter the valley of Gura, in which our fort was situated, by the 7th of March. Having continually impressed on the commanding general what the facts within his knowledge dictated should be done, I took further occasion to enlarge on these matters at a council of all the Egyptian officers, pachas, and beys, a very large gathering, including the commanding general, Prince Hassan, and his aide-de-camp, Zorab Bey. I presented my opinions in the following terms, hoping that if there were any among them who dared brave the commanding general (his peculiarities being so apparent) they would give expression to their assent. I requested Prince Hassan and Zorab Bey, his aide, both accomplished English and Arabic scholars, to interpret what I had to say, in order that there might be no misunderstanding of what was said. I explained to them the movements of King John up to that moment, as detailed in the foregoing paragraphs, and our own situation no less succinctly, as already pictured. My argument was that Fort Gura was impregnable, and that something ought to be done at once to meet and counteract King John, and that to that end the defences at Khaya Khor should be completed without delay. It was urged that a force of 700 or 800 men should be left in Fort Gura, with a complement of artillery, as this command could defy the enemy, while even 500 men could hold the place.

The rest of the command, over 6000 strong, armed with Remington rifles and a heavy park of artillery, including the Krupp guns, of which there were a large number, should be moved at once to Khaya Khor, six miles distant, and there united with the command of Osman Pacha, which was about 2500 strong, who also had artillery, in this manner not only protecting the rear but keeping open the communication for reinforcements which were soon expected. Further, it was recommended that General Field should be brought from Bahr Rezza, about thirty-five or forty miles distant, where he was engaged on duty with a command of about 1500 strong, at the earliest possible moment. By the time King John could concentrate in the valley we could meet him or not as we pleased, from Khaya Khor, a strong position, with full 10,000 effective men. Here we could wait and watch his movements. Our energies should be used in getting up troops from the rear, strengthening the defences of Khaya Khor, and improving the means of getting water at that fort, this being scarce and distant, except in small quantities, at the pass proposed to be fortified. It was also important to send more formidable scouts to distract the enemy and get information of his movements and designs. It was certain that King John was near us, moving to our rear ; he was out of supplies, and with his immense motley crowd of men, women and children he had to go great distances to get water. From his position and necessities he would be forced to take the Amhoor and Arato trails in order to obtain supplies. These trails ran between Fort Gura and Khaya Khor and near the latter. All his energies would be strained to enter the valley of Gura, where these trails debouched into it, and to force a passage across it, a distance of only two miles, and then over the hills to water and provisions. He did not fear an attack from Khaya Khor one mile distant from these trails, or Fort Gura, five miles distant, all information concurring to inform him that this command did not intend to attack him. Messengers were reported as coming from him saying that he expected at his leisure to hem up the Egyptian forces in this fort. When we were concentrated at Khaya Khor, the enemy, on making the attempt to cross the valley, should be attacked in flank with our whole power and with no hesitation, all being prepared beforehand to go at him without gloves. With our strength, discipline, and splendid arms, such a sudden blow at his hordes, unprepared for an attack, would certainly be crowned with success. Under no circumstances should we divide our forces ; that would be fatal. Nor should we place our forces outside of our fortifications or beyond their protection, and act upon the defensive ; that too would be fatal. Unless we did as advised, the rocks, hills, and valleys, densely covered with trees, would give the enemy complete protection and all the advantages over us. It was forcibly impressed on the council that if we attempted the defensive in the valley it would not be long before an unseen enemy would lurk, just as it did in the affair of the unfortunate Arrendrup, behind every bush, rock, gulley, and hill, and surround us as it did that command. This country, they saw, was adapted to such warfare, and the result must be the serious injury if not the destruction of the army. This statement made a deep impression upon many present. After many hours' conversation with them I left them amid the discussion of it in the Arabic and Turkish languages. That night Prince Hassan came to my tent and said he approved of what I had said, and added, “ What do you think? Several said after you left that your advice ought to be followed. Thereupon Ratib Pacha pounced upon them, and they, afraid of authority, at once subsided. Another pacha ventured the remark that King John would undoubtedly take the trails Amhoor and Arato into the valley that you pointed out to them. Another (not Ratib) answering quickly, ' Let King John take the roads and go to hell,' the prince added, ' What can you expect from such people?' ” He then closed by saying, “ You have done all you could ; they have your opinion ; now if they don't follow it they are to blame.” He said in continuation that Raschid Pacha and Osman Pacha would, when the scratch came, take the army into their own hands, leading me to understand that these two men, his chief commanders, had no confidence in Ratib Pacha, their general. Raschid died like a hero on the field of battle ; but Osman, the other division commander, skulked miserably behind the works he had constructed at Khaya Khor, and though within a mile of his people in full sight, he lay supinely looking down upon them in their death struggle, without raising a finger to help them. An account of this more in detail will be given further on. He subsequently acknowledged that he did not fire upon the enemy for fear of drawing them upon his fort. After our fighting was over this man came to our camp and said to Prince Hassan that he had killed and buried eight hundred Abyssinians. Upon entering the tent of the prince at this time, I was told this story, and having positive evidence, besides my own observations, of its utter falsity in every particular, I said to the prince in the presence of this pacha, that his statement was false ; that he not only had not killed a single Abyssinian, but had shamefully skulked behind his breastworks ; that if he was in any other army in the world he would be tried by a drum-head court-martial and shot as a worthless coward.

The prince, continuing his conversation on the council of war, said that he would advise letting Ratib have his own way. My reply to the prince was that it was a great misfortune to have such a commander, but that I should do all I could to help the success of the Khedive's army. This closed the conversation. My colloquy with the pacha and that at the council of war was studied and reduced to writing before it took place, and was subsequently reported officially. No plan of operations was agreed upon. As usual, everything was left to chance. The army drifted along toward the rapidly approaching catastrophe. After this conference, on the 4th of March, Osman Pacha, commander of Khaya Khor, came to the fort. Subsequently he informed me that after a conversation with Ratib he had been ordered to march nearly his entire force to Fort Gura, virtually abandoning our rear in the face of the enemy and jeopardizing the command of Field and his convoy of supplies, soon expected at that fort. Knowing the importance of preventing this misfortune I went at once to the commanding general and had the order changed.

Part II, Chapter X

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